



Bridging the Gap: How Key Actors and Informal Practices Sustain Agrarian Reform in Indonesia's Decentralized Governance

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<p>Received: April 28, 2025 Revised: March 15, 2026 Accepted: April 03, 2026 Available online: April 20, 2026</p>	<p>This study examines how key actors and informal practices sustain the implementation of agrarian reform under Indonesia's decentralized governance, focusing on the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA). It aims to bridge the gap between formal institutional arrangements and actual policy outcomes by analyzing how collaboration unfolds in practice. Using a longitudinal qualitative design (2021–2024), the study draws on 45 in-depth interviews and policy document analysis across two contrasting districts—Sragen (high-performing) and Temanggung (low-performing). The analysis is guided by collaborative governance and multidimensional integration frameworks. The findings reveal three core dynamics. First, GTRA collaboration largely stagnates at the coordination level, with only 29% of forums producing actionable outcomes due to the absence of integrated systems and joint budgeting. Second, institutional dominance—particularly by the Land Office—creates informal “shadow hierarchies” that undermine horizontal collaboration. Third, informal personal networks play a decisive role, enabling 91% of successful initiatives but contributing to 63% of institutional memory loss following leadership rotation. The study concludes that agrarian reform is sustained through a paradoxical reliance on personalized leadership within fragmented systems. To address this, it proposes a hybrid governance model that institutionalizes adaptive leadership, codifies knowledge transfer, and embeds informal collaboration within formal structures. This approach offers a context-sensitive alternative to conventional models, emphasizing relational governance as a pathway to more resilient and inclusive policy implementation.</p>
<p>KEYWORDS</p> <p>Agrarian reform, service integration, collaborative governance, personal dimension, GTRA.</p>	
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INTRODUCTION

Agrarian reform has long been promoted as a key policy instrument for addressing structural inequality and promoting inclusive rural development. Yet translating this ambition into practice remains far from straightforward. In many countries, efforts to implement agrarian reform often encounter persistent institutional fragmentation, where multiple agencies hold overlapping responsibilities but lack effective coordination. As a result, collaborative platforms established to integrate policies across sectors frequently struggle to function as genuine arenas for joint decision-making. Rather than fostering horizontal collaboration, these forums sometimes reproduce existing bureaucratic hierarchies and sectoral boundaries, ultimately limiting the integration of agrarian policies in practice.

This study addresses a critical gap in the literature on agrarian governance: the lack of a clear operational definition and analytical framework for understanding “integrated services” within the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA). While collaborative governance has become a dominant lens for analyzing cross-sector coordination (Ansell & Gash, 2008), its application often assumes relatively balanced institutional relationships and deliberative decision-making processes. In many developing-country contexts, however, collaborative forums operate within fragmented bureaucratic structures and uneven power relations. Under such conditions, formal collaborative arrangements may exist but fail to function as genuinely integrative governance mechanisms.

GTRA was designed as a cross-sector, multi-stakeholder forum involving the Ministry of ATR/BPN, the Ministry of Forestry, local governments, and civil society organizations to coordinate agrarian reform policies. In practice, however, the institutional architecture of GTRA remains weakly

operationalized. No clear definition or measurable indicators of “integrated land services” have been formally established either by the state or within academic scholarship. As a result, many GTRA institutions function primarily as coordination forums rather than integrated governance platforms. An internal report from the [Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs \(2024\)](#) shows that 46% of district GTRAs lack permanent secretariats and around 70% operate without standardized cross-agency procedures. These institutional limitations suggest that the key challenge in GTRA is not simply the absence of collaboration, but the interaction between fragmented institutional design and asymmetric power relations that shape how collaboration actually unfolds in practice.

To better understand this dynamic, this study integrates the collaborative governance framework of [Ansell and Gash \(2008\)](#) with [Konrad's \(1996\)](#) multidimensional model of service integration. While the former explains the processes through which actors interact in collaborative settings, the latter provides a structural lens to assess the degree of institutional integration across governance arrangements. By combining these perspectives, the study offers a more context-sensitive framework for analyzing how institutional structures and informal power relations shape the outcomes of agrarian reform collaboration.

Integrated services have demonstrated efficacy as a bureaucratic reform strategy in global practice. In New Zealand, the integration among implementing agencies facilitates efficient cross-sector coordination, minimizes policy duplication, and enhances the quality of public services ([Scott & Bardach, 2019](#); [State Services Commission, 2008](#)). Additional research indicates that service integration enhances service quality ([Bolden et al., 2023](#)), broadens access to information ([Hall et al., 2012](#)), boosts

staff satisfaction (Urada et al., 2012), and diminishes social stigma associated with specific services (Duffy et al., 2019). In Indonesia, various studies have examined integrative services in a number of sectors, such as health (Supiatni et al., 2023), public administration (Pratama, 2020), education (Fitria et al., 2023), trade (Magdariza, 2017), financial services (Rumbogo et al., 2021), and livestock (Dean & Indrianti, 2020). In a similar vein, numerous studies on GTRA have been undertaken, addressing institutional aspects (Habib Ferian Fajar et al., 2022; Sutaryono et al., 2024), organizational strengthening (Rineksi, 2022; Ross, 2018), work procedures (Salim et al., 2021), and the forms and relationships among members (Darmawan et al., 2023). However, the absence of a clear operationalization of "integrated services" in GTRA—coupled with the lack of comparative analysis with international models—reveals a critical research gap. This study bridges this gap by defining integration metrics and contrasting Indonesia's GTRA with cases like New Zealand's cross-agency coordination and South Africa's DLRC failures.

Studies on service integration and cross-sector collaboration have developed significantly within the public policy literature. Among the most influential frameworks is Collaborative Governance proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), which highlights the importance of starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and deliberative collaborative processes in achieving collective outcomes. While this framework has been widely applied in studies of inter-organizational collaboration, its analytical assumptions often presuppose relatively balanced institutional relationships and deliberative decision-making environments. In many Global South governance contexts, however, collaborative arrangements frequently operate within hierarchical bureaucratic structures and patronage networks that shape access to authority and decision-making power. Under such conditions, collaboration may formally exist but function through asymmetric power relations rather than horizontal deliberation, suggesting the need to complement the Collaborative Governance framework with additional analytical perspectives that can capture institutional fragmentation and informal authority structures.

To address this analytical limitation, this study incorporates Konrad's (1996) multidimensional framework of service integration. Originally developed to analyze coordination across social service systems, Konrad's framework provides a structural lens for assessing the degree of institutional integration across governance arrangements, including dimensions such as governance, planning, funding, information systems, and service delivery mechanisms. Despite its analytical potential, the framework has rarely been applied to agrarian governance or land policy studies. By combining Ansell and Gash's process-oriented perspective on collaboration with Konrad's structural approach to institutional integration, this study develops a hybrid analytical framework for examining agrarian reform governance. This approach allows the study to capture both the collaborative processes among actors and the institutional conditions that shape the effectiveness of cross-sector coordination within the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA).

Previous research on GTRA tends to focus on the legal-administrative aspects, such as land certification performance (Darmawan et al., 2023) or institutional work procedures (Salim et al., 2021), but ignores the relational dimension of collaboration. In fact, studies in South Africa prove that District Land Reform Committees (DLRC) failed not because of policy design, but because of the absence of facilitative leadership and the

imbalance of power relations between institutions (Hall & Kepe, 2017; Waeterloos, 2020). The ambiguity of the duties of actors in Indonesia—from the Ministry of ATR/BPN and civil society organizations to local governments—is exacerbated by the absence of an operational definition of "integrative services" in the GTRA. This phenomenon suggests a theoretical gap: Ansell & Gash (2008) Collaborative Governance framework, although effective in explaining the dynamics of collaboration in developed countries, has not been able to fully address the complexity of the context of developing countries such as Indonesia, where personal factors (e.g., political patronage or individual capacity) are often the main determinants of successful integration.

This study addresses this gap through four strategic steps. First, testing the application of Konrad (1996) multidimensional framework in the context of GTRA to map the level of institutional integration holistically. Second, identifying determinant factors—both drivers and inhibitors—in the process of agrarian service integration. Third, comparing empirical findings in Indonesia with international practices to identify universal and context-specific patterns. Fourth, making personal characteristics like key actors, patron-client relationships, and individual capacity critical in Ansell & Gash (2008) Collaborative Governance paradigm. This study uses a qualitative-comparative approach in three districts with different GTRA performance (high, medium, low) to show how institutional design, human resource capabilities, and local power relations affect integrated service delivery. These findings not only revise the universalistic assumptions in collaboration theory but also provide operational policy recommendations to strengthen GTRA—an urgency considering that 70% of GTRA districts still do not have cross-institutional SOPs (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2024).

Building on these theoretical considerations, this study examines the dynamics of collaborative governance within Indonesia's Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA). In particular, the study seeks to answer the following research question: How do institutional design and informal power relations interact to shape integration outcomes in GTRA?

Thus, this study makes a double contribution: practically, it explains the complex dynamics of Indonesian agrarian reform policy; theoretically, it broadens the insight into institutional integration by including the socio-cultural dimension. The reconceptualization of Konrad (1996) framework through the integration of the personal dimension—especially in the context of developing countries—is a major breakthrough, given that patronage and individual capacity factors are often overlooked in collaboration analyses.

METHOD

This study uses a multi-layered qualitative approach to explore institutional integration in agrarian reform implementation through GTRA. A longitudinal perspective is particularly important because collaborative dynamics in GTRA are strongly shaped by the personal roles of key actors and by bureaucratic rotation, which frequently disrupt institutional memory and reshape patterns of coordination among participating agencies. Building on case study methodology (Yin, 2015), this research combines descriptive and analytical elements to examine both structural and relational dimensions of cross-sector collaboration.

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implementation through GTRA. Building on case study methodology (Yin, 2015), This research combines descriptive and analytical elements to examine both structural and relational dimensions of cross-sector collaboration. The approach was chosen to capture the complexity of interagency dynamics, where formal processes intersect with informal power relations (Creswell, 2016). Two key considerations guided this choice: (1) the need to navigate bureaucratic constraints through adaptive sampling strategies, and (2) the importance of contextual depth in understanding implementation gaps.

The longitudinal research (2021-2024) employed a phased data collection strategy across eleven districts, with focused analysis on Sragen and Temanggung as contrasting cases. Primary data came from 45 in-depth interviews with Land Office officials (60%), local government representatives (25%), and NGO actors (15%), selected through purposive and snowball sampling to ensure diverse perspectives. Secondary data included GTRA technical documents, meeting minutes spanning 2019-2023, and land certification records. A distinctive feature was the systematic integration of intentional data (planned interviews) with serendipitous findings from field observations and document analysis.

To ensure analytical rigor, this study employed a hybrid framework integrating three complementary analytical strategies. First, a modified thematic analysis was conducted using deductive codes derived from Ansell and Gash's (2008) Collaborative Governance framework and Konrad's (1996) Multidimensional Integration model. This was complemented by inductive coding to capture emergent themes grounded in field data. Second, relational narrative analysis was utilized to explore inter-actor power dynamics, incorporating network mapping and metaphor interpretation to uncover underlying patron-client structures and informal negotiation mechanisms embedded in collaborative practices. Third, a comparative case analysis was applied to assess the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) in Sragen and Temanggung Regencies. The comparison focused on six key indicators of institutional integration: the completeness of standard operating procedures (SOPs), frequency of inter-agency meetings, joint budget allocation, involvement of non-BPN actors, the presence of a permanent secretariat, and performance evaluation mechanisms. This triangulated approach enabled a comprehensive understanding of the complexities of service integration and collaborative dynamics in the context of agrarian reform governance in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Initial Conditions of Collaboration: Fragmentation and Inequality

Institutional collaboration in the implementation of agrarian reform by the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) in Sragen and Temanggung Regencies has shown complex dynamics since the early stages of formation. Field findings indicate that relations between GTRA members have not been built in an equal and inclusive manner. While other Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD), including the Agriculture Service, Social Service, and Regional Development Planning Agency, tend to be inactive and only show up when specifically invited, the Land Office seems to play a major role. An informant stated, "The active ones are us from the Land Office. If we don't invite them, the agencies don't come." (Interview, Sragen).

This imbalance reflects problematic starting conditions for collaboration. However, the issue is not merely one of power asymmetry among participating institutions. Field evidence suggests that the collaborative forum operates within a broader hierarchical state culture, where authority is traditionally concentrated in a lead agency and other institutions tend to adopt a reactive rather than proactive role. In the case of GTRA, the Land Office is widely perceived as the primary authority in agrarian affairs, which implicitly reinforces vertical coordination patterns rather than horizontal collaboration. As a result, other agencies often wait for invitations or directives from the Land Office instead of actively initiating joint actions. Under such conditions, the collaborative platform formally exists but operates within an administrative hierarchy that limits the emergence of genuine inter-agency deliberation.

The deliberative process is weakened and the formation of a sense of shared ownership, which is a critical component of collaborative governance, is impeded by the dominance of one institution. This finding is in line with various international studies, such as Ghatak & Ghosh (2011) in India and Hall & Kepe (2017); Jönsson & Huzzard (2021) in South Africa, which show that the failure of agrarian reform is often caused by the imbalance of authority between institutions and minimal local participation.

At the local level, the absence of a neutral facilitator or cross-sectoral coordination unit worsens the situation. The process of aligning perceptions and formulating a common agenda is not optimal due to the absence of stakeholder mapping or institutional readiness assessment. This is contrary to the guidelines for effective collaboration proposed by Emerson et al (2012) and Bryson et al. (2015), which emphasize the importance of pre-collaborative capacity building.

Thus, the initial conditions of GTRA in Sragen and Temanggung show classic challenges in cross-sector collaboration practices: unequal relations, weak coordination, and the absence of a systematic perception alignment mechanism. If not immediately fixed, this condition will make GTRA only a formal administrative container, not a space for co-creation of agrarian public policies and services.

Institutional Design: Fragile GTRA Structure

The institutional design of GTRA at the district/city level still faces fundamental problems in terms of structure and governance. The Decree (SK) for the establishment of GTRA by the regional head generally only includes the names of individuals, not structural positions. This results in high dependence on certain figures and triggers operational disruption when there is rotation or transfer of employees. In addition, the GTRA structure tends to be ad hoc without the support of a permanent secretariat, standard reporting system, or cross-sector standard operating procedures. The study results show that the institutional design of GTRA hampers integration due to three structural weaknesses: (1) Position-based vs. personalistic appointments - 87% of coordination breakdowns occurred after staff rotation (Sragen case); (2) Lack of binding SOPs - only 2 out of 11 districts had inter-agency memorandums of understanding; (3) Ad-hoc secretariat - 46% of districts lacked permanent administrative support. These findings contradict the framework of Ansell & Gash (2008), suggesting that the personal dimension is more dominant than institutional design in developing country contexts (cf. Waeterloos, 2020 on South African DLRCs).

In reality, [Ansell & Gash \(2008\)](#) contend that the sustainability of collaboration is contingent upon the presence of a stable institutional structure, an inclusive forum, and an explicit regulatory framework. The absence of SOPs, cross-sector MOUs, and routine coordination forums makes GTRA vulnerable to coordination dysfunction and weak institutional accountability.

Comparative studies from various countries emphasize the importance of a strong institutional structure. In Brazil, the agrarian reform program supported by the MST social movement succeeded in showing significant achievements due to the existence of an established coordination structure and a supportive legal framework ([Wolford, 2010](#)). Similarly, [Hall & Kepe \(2017\)](#) study in South Africa showed that the success of the program was largely determined by the existence of a strong institutional anchor.

Revitalizing the institutional design of GTRA requires the following strategic steps: (1). Position-based restructuring: Replacing the personalistic approach in the SK with a functional, position-based structure to ensure continuity of roles. (2). Preparation of institutional documents includes the development of cross-sectoral standard operating procedures (SOPs), memoranda of understanding (MoUs), and integrated reporting systems. (3). Independent secretariat: Establishment of a special secretariat that functions as a facilitator of collaboration between agencies. (4). Documentation and accountability system: recording minutes, periodic reporting, and evaluation mechanisms based on performance indicators. (5). Development of institutional memory: A digital database containing program track records, good practices, and institutional resources. (6). Public communication strategy: Using open forums and digital information channels to increase transparency and community involvement. (7). Diversification of funding sources involves accessing non-APBD funds by collaborating with donors, corporate social responsibility initiatives, and village-owned enterprises (BUMDes). (8). Dispute resolution system: Development of transparent, fair, and inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms.

Furthermore, it is crucial to enhance GTRA's human resource capacity by providing continuous training in public communication, policy advocacy, spatial planning, and conflict resolution. The involvement of universities and NGOs as strategic partners can provide support for research, advocacy, and institutional strengthening.

The efficacy and accountability of GTRA will be enhanced by the implementation of information technology, including digital platforms and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for public consultation and program reporting. Local governments as the main actors in decentralization must demonstrate strong leadership and provide adequate resources.

Amid challenges such as resistance from the status quo, fiscal constraints, and the complexity of cross-sector coordination, GTRA still has great potential to become a transformative agrarian reform instrument. Periodic evaluations based on quantitative indicators—such as distributed land area, resolved disputes, and community participation levels—must be conducted to objectively assess achievements.

Gender mainstreaming in program planning is just as important. In order for women to have access to land and have a say in decisions, affirmative action laws must be in place. Agrarian reform must also work with other development plans, especially those that aim to slow down climate change and make

sure there is enough food for everyone, so that we can solve the world's increasingly complicated problems. Building a culture of agrarian reform among the bureaucracy and civil society, with the values of transparency, justice, and participation, is a primary prerequisite for the sustainability of the program. Only with true collaboration and support from all components of the nation can the ideals of agrarian reform as a pillar of social justice and sustainable development truly be realized.

Collaboration Process: Informal Communication and Partial Coordination

Institutional coordination of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) in Sragen and Temanggung Districts is still dominated by informal communication, such as personal messages via messaging applications. The absence of regular deliberative forums and the absence of a structured cross-agency communication system have weakened the formation of shared understanding and commitment to the process, as stated by [Ansell & Gash \(2008\)](#). Practices in the field clearly illustrate this condition, such as the confession of one party, "Usually we are only informed via cellphone; there is no special forum for talking between agencies" (DISPERKIMTARU, Temanggung).

The coordination forum, which should be a deliberative space, actually functions as a means of conveying one-way information. In Temanggung, GTRA forum activities are only intensive before visits from the provincial or national level, not as a routine institutional agenda. The weakness of this deliberative structure hinders the formation of mutual understanding and shared accountability, which are prerequisites for successful cross-sector collaboration.

Institutional coordination within GTRA therefore reveals a paradoxical dynamic. On the one hand, informal communication among key actors serves as a compensatory mechanism that enables coordination in the absence of formal collaborative structures. Personal messaging networks allow actors to exchange information quickly and navigate bureaucratic constraints that would otherwise slow down decision-making. On the other hand, the heavy reliance on informal communication also reflects underlying institutional fragility. Because coordination depends largely on personal relationships rather than institutionalized procedures, information flows remain uneven and institutional memory becomes vulnerable to bureaucratic rotation. Consequently, informal communication simultaneously sustains collaboration while limiting its institutionalization within GTRA.

In fact, as emphasized by [Innes & Booher \(2000\)](#), structured and recurring deliberation is essential to foster a sense of shared ownership and encourage innovation in problem solving. GTRA needs to build a formal communication system that complements informal communication. This includes holding regular meetings, recording minutes, planned follow-up, and joint evaluation mechanisms. Without such a system, documentation is minimal, performance evaluation is difficult, and institutional learning does not occur effectively.

GTRA integration matrix analysis reveals four policy solutions: (1) Hybrid governance structure (combination of formal SOPs and innovation zones); (2) Development of a leadership pipeline with collaborative literacy training; (3) Integration dashboard to monitor SOP implementation, budget alignment, and participation levels; (4) Transformation of patronage into a peer accountability system and documentation of best practices.

Lessons can be learned from international practices. In New Zealand, for example, collaboration between institutions is supported by regularly scheduled multi-agency meetings with a shared agenda and integrated documentation (State Services Commission, 2008). Meanwhile, the Agrarian Reform movement in Brazil through the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) relies on weekly meetings as a space for collective decision-making (Wolford, 2010).

Therefore, GTRA coordination needs to transform from a personal relationship-based network to a transparent and accountable institutional system. Regular, inclusive, and documented deliberative processes should become the norm, not the exception. Without an adequate formal framework, GTRA is at risk of continuing to be in a reactive rather than proactive pattern. Potential initiatives may fail to be followed up because they do not receive cross-sector support, while crucial issues are difficult to address comprehensively. As a result, GTRA's strategic goal of realizing fair and sustainable agrarian management is at risk of not being optimally achieved.

Furthermore, the dominance of informal communication also has the potential to create information bias and exclusion of participation. Important information may not be conveyed evenly or interpreted differently by each actor. Parties who are not part of a personal network are vulnerable to feeling left out and losing motivation to contribute. This is certainly contrary to the principle of inclusivity in collaboration.

It is important to emphasize that building a formal communication system does not mean eliminating informal communication. Personal networks remain important as a reinforcement of relationships and trust between parties. However, informal communication must be a complement, not a substitute for formal structures. Any information shared informally should be confirmed, recorded, and followed up in an official forum to maintain accountability.

The implementation of this formal communication system requires collective commitment from all related parties—including local governments, vertical agencies, civil society organizations, and farmer groups. The process is not instant, but investment in a transparent and accountable communication system will have a long-term impact. Through scheduled forums, orderly recording, and clear follow-up, every stakeholder can have the same understanding of the direction of GTRA, their respective roles, and the achievements that have been achieved. Evaluation becomes more systematic, and learning from field experiences can be institutionalized (Hendro et al., 2023). Thus, GTRA will become a more effective, sustainable, and useful forum for the community.

Facilitative Leadership: Dominance of Kantah and Non-Involvement of OPD

In both districts, the Land Office (Kantah) plays a very dominant role in the implementation of GTRA, especially in technical aspects. However, this dominance is not balanced with adequate cross-sector coordination capacity. Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD) appear passive and tend to only respond when invited, not as active partners (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Determinants of GTRA Performance in Sragen vs. Temanggung (Radial chart comparing 5 variables: Institutional Design, Leadership Quality, Patronage Networks, Budget Integration, Community Participation)

This lack of facilitative leadership is one of the main obstacles in building joint commitment and resolving conflicts that arise in the collaboration process.

Facilitative leadership, as formulated by Ansell and Gash (2008), should be present to bridge the interests of actors, resolve differences, and ensure the sustainability of collaboration. However, the administrative and centralized leadership in Kantah has not been able to encourage equal and open participation. As a result, the burden of implementing GTRA seems to be borne by only one institution, which not only causes institutional fatigue but also threatens the sustainability of the program.

Successful collaboration requires an inspiring leader (Emerson et al., 2012) who is able to build trust, encourage synergy between actors, and ensure inclusiveness and transparency. Single dominance risks creating resistance or pseudo-participation from OPDs, which ultimately erodes the co-creative essence of the GTRA forum and limits the inclusion of perspectives and innovations from other sectors.

Several international studies, such as Wolford (2010) in the context of agrarian reform in Brazil and Cameron et al. (2020) in the integration of social services in developed countries, show the importance of collaborative leaders who are able to integrate actors with different backgrounds to achieve common goals.

Therefore, it is necessary to reorganize the GTRA leadership structure so that it is not centralized in the Land Office. One approach that can be considered is the formation of a cross-sector coordination team or the appointment of a liaison officer who has the capacity for communication, neutrality, and legitimacy between institutions. In addition, collaborative leadership training needs to be provided to strengthen the capacity of human resources in managing multi-actor dynamics in a participatory manner.

This reorganization also needs to consider incentives for OPDs to be actively involved. Currently, the involvement of OPDs is often perceived as an additional burden that is not appreciated. Incentive schemes such as awards, public recognition, or budget

allocation based on GTRA performance can be a driver for the emergence of a sense of ownership and collective responsibility.

The transformation of the GTRA forum from a formality space to an open and constructive dialogue space is also urgent. Facilitative leaders need to create a safe and inclusive atmosphere where each actor feels comfortable expressing their views and concerns. Facilitation techniques such as actor mapping, collaborative SWOT analysis, or participatory planning workshops can be methods for building consensus and joint solutions (Sandy & Inayati, 2022).

Furthermore, transparency and accountability in the GTRA process must be improved. Information on progress, obstacles, and resource use must be openly available and easily accessible to all parties involved. Feedback mechanisms and regular evaluations are also important so that GTRA implementation continues to run according to objectives and produces real benefits for the community.

The success of GTRA is contingent not only upon technical accomplishments in the land sector but also on the capacity to harmonize social, economic, and political aspects in program planning and execution. Consequently, effective facilitative leadership must embrace a multidisciplinary and holistic approach to ensure that GTRA genuinely serves as a tool for sustainable and inclusive development. Finally, the structuring of GTRA leadership requires a strong political commitment from the local government. Without such support, efforts to strengthen collaborative leadership and increase cross-sector participation will be difficult to realize. Agrarian reform ideas, sufficient administrative backing, and the distribution of sufficient resources are all necessary for this pledge to come to fruition. Thus, GTRA can play an optimal role in realizing agrarian justice and community welfare.

Dimensions of Integration Services

To understand how far institutional integration has progressed within GTRA, this study draws on the multidimensional service integration framework developed by Ellen Konrad (1996). In this framework, integration is viewed as a continuum that ranges from basic information sharing to more advanced forms of institutional coordination and fully integrated governance arrangements. Applying this perspective allows us to examine how collaboration among GTRA actors unfolds across several dimensions, including governance structures, planning mechanisms, funding arrangements, and information systems.

The empirical findings summarized in Table X indicate that the level of integration in both Sragen and Temanggung remains largely limited to coordination and informal cooperation. Although some forms of information exchange and inter-agency interaction are present, more substantive mechanisms of integration—such as joint planning, shared service delivery, and collective accountability—are still largely absent. In other words, collaboration exists, but it has not yet developed into a fully integrated governance arrangement.

Beyond these descriptive findings, the analysis reveals three recurring patterns that help explain why deeper integration remains difficult to achieve in the GTRA context.

Shadow Hierarchy

Although GTRA is formally designed as a horizontal multi-stakeholder forum, decision-making processes in practice continue to reflect existing bureaucratic hierarchies. In many cases, the Land Office acts as the central coordinating authority in agrarian matters, which implicitly shapes the agenda and

direction of collaborative activities. As a result, other participating agencies often take a more reactive role rather than actively initiating joint actions. Collaboration therefore occurs within what can be described as a “shadow hierarchy,” where formal equality among actors coexists with informal vertical authority structures.

Ritualistic Compliance

A second pattern observed in the implementation of GTRA is what may be termed **ritualistic compliance**. Coordination meetings and collaborative forums are regularly organized, fulfilling the formal requirements of inter-agency collaboration. However, many of these meetings function primarily as procedural activities rather than spaces for substantive joint decision-making. Consequently, while the formal indicators of collaboration appear to be present, the actual outcomes of policy integration remain limited.

Personalization Paradox

The third pattern concerns the strong role played by individual actors in sustaining collaboration. Field evidence suggests that personal relationships and informal networks among key officials often become the main drivers of coordination across institutions. These relationships help overcome bureaucratic barriers and facilitate communication among agencies. At the same time, this reliance on personal leadership creates a paradox. While individual initiative enables collaboration to function in practice, it also makes the collaborative process vulnerable to leadership turnover. When key actors are transferred or rotated, institutional memory is often lost and coordination patterns must be rebuilt from the beginning.

The empirical findings summarized in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the level of integration in both Sragen and Temanggung remains largely limited to coordination and informal cooperation rather than strategic collaboration.

Table 1. Levels of GTRA Activities in Sragen and Temanggung Regencies

Level of Integration	Type of Activity	Sragen	Temanggung
1. Information Sharing and Communication	Distribution of brochures	✗	✗
	Educational presentations	✓	✗
	Newspaper publications	✓	✓
	Educational videos	✗	✗
	Inter-agency staff meetings	✓	✓
2. Coordination and Cooperation	Client referrals between agencies	✓	✗
	Monitor interagency processes	✓	✓
	Informal verbal deals	✓	✓
	Acceptance of other	✗	✗

	agencies' requests		
	Collaboration to influence legislation or funding	✓	✓
3. Collaboration	Cross-functional training, formal agreements, and shared data	X	✓
4. Consolidation	Government agencies responsible for coordinating various public welfare services	✓	✓
5. Integration	Centralized service centers with unified registration and needs assessment processes and operational authority	X	X

Notes: ✓ = Activity conducted; X = Activity not conducted
 Source: Processed by the researcher

At first glance, GTRA may appear to have reached the level of consolidation, as stated in Presidential Regulation No. 86 of 2018 and Presidential Regulation No. 63 of 2023, which assign it a coordinating and integrative role among ministries and agencies. However, empirical evidence gathered from the field tells a more nuanced story. As demonstrated in Table 1, the actual practices of GTRA in both Sragen and Temanggung do not yet reflect the characteristics of full-fledged collaboration.

In Sragen, for instance, members of the GTRA have not yet formalized their cooperation through written agreements—an essential marker of collaborative governance. Although such agreements do exist in Temanggung, they are relatively recent and have not yet been tested or institutionalized. Therefore, this study concludes that the level of collaboration has not yet been achieved in either regency.

When the implementation of GTRA is evaluated against the 14 dimensions of human service integration proposed by Konrad (1996), the integration process in both regencies appears to remain at the level of informal coordination. There is little evidence of strategic collaboration or integrated service delivery. The detailed assessment is presented below.

Table 2. Evaluation of GTRA Implementation Based on Konrad's Integration Dimensions

Dimension	Findings in Sragen and Temanggung
1. Partners	Multi-agency involvement exists, but relationships remain sectoral and

		hierarchical; lacks formal strategic interdependence.
2. Target Population		Absence of joint prioritization and targeting causes service gaps and redundancies.
3. Goals		National GTRA objectives are not operationalized at the local level, causing misalignment among agencies.
4. Policy and Legislation		Dependence on broad national regulations; absence of detailed local technical mechanisms for collaboration.
5. Governance		GTRA lacks a permanent leadership structure with decision-making authority; governance is ad hoc.
6. Service Model		Services are delivered in parallel and sectoral; no co-location, unified registration, or joint assessment mechanisms.
7. Stakeholders		Limited civic society and farmer participation; technocratic efforts.
8. Planning and Budgeting		Each agency plans and budgets independently; no cross-sector action plans exist.
9. Funding		No pooled or joint budgeting; full reliance on sectoral budgets limits innovation and shared ownership.
10. Outcomes and Accountability		No interagency performance indicators; evaluation remains output-based and siloed.
11. Contracting and Licensing		No integrated service standards, accreditation mechanisms, or cross-sector contracts.
12. Information Systems		Each agency maintains its own database; no integrative platform leads to data duplication and poor targeting.

Source: Processed by the researcher

This study extends Konrad's (1996) framework through three empirical findings: (A) The Shadow Hierarchy Phenomenon: Although the GTRA structure appears horizontal, decision-making still follows a bureaucratic hierarchy—in contrast to New Zealand's egalitarian model (Scott & Bardach, 2019). This explains why 72% of initiatives required Land Office approval despite being multi-stakeholder in design. (B) Ritualistic vs. Substantial Integration: GTRA meetings demonstrate ceremonial compliance without implementation—100% of districts held quarterly meetings, but only 29% produced cross-agency action plans. This pattern is similar to the Brazilian MST movement where formal structures masked power imbalances (Wolford, 2010). (C) The Personalization Paradox: 91% of successful collaborations were driven by key actors through informal negotiations (57% of cases) and bypassing procedures (34%). However, their departure resulted in a 63% loss of institutional memory—a risk overlooked in Ansell & Gash's model.

Evaluation of the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Land Movement (GTRA) in Sragen and Temanggung Districts based on 12 dimensions of human service integration (Konrad, 1996) revealed that service integration is still in the informal coordination phase and has not yet achieved strategic collaboration. A detailed analysis of the 12 observed dimensions shows several critical findings. First, from the partnership aspect, although involving many Regional Apparatus Organizations

(OPD), inter-institutional relations are still sectoral and coordinative without formal strategic interdependence. Second, the absence of joint mapping of target population priorities causes services to be partial, triggering overlapping programs and access gaps. Third, the national objectives of GTRA have not been operationalized concretely at the regional level, so that sectoral targets are not integrated into a holistic policy framework. Fourth, although supported by Presidential Regulations (Perpres) and Regent Decrees (SK), GTRA implementation still relies on local interpretations without technical policies that regulate inter-agency collaboration mechanisms.

In terms of governance, GTRA's ownership structure lacks effective coordinating authority, so decision-making is ad hoc and non-institutionalized. The parallel and sectoral service models also exacerbate fragmentation, as there is no integration of locations, registration, needs assessments, or cross-agency referrals. The involvement of civil society and farmer groups is also limited, with GTRA activities tending to be technocratic and lacking in participatory dialogue. In terms of planning and funding, the absence of collaborative action plans, joint budgets (pooling funds), and cross-agency performance indicators further strengthens the sectoral approach. Fragmented information systems and the absence of integrated service standards also increase the risk of data duplication and inaccurate targeting.

These findings indicate that GTRA is still trapped in a phase of loose coordination with procedural rather than substantive integration. Konrad (1996) framework helps identify the root of the problem, namely the weakness of institutional structures capable of encouraging strategic collaboration. To achieve true integration, multidimensional transformation is needed. First, the structural aspect requires clear mapping of cross-sectoral roles, the establishment of an authoritative collective decision-making forum, and the development of collaborative SOPs that include integrated service flows. Funding innovation through pooling funds or sharing budgets is also important to avoid dependence on sectoral budgets. Second, the technical-operational aspect demands an integrated data system with a secure information-sharing platform and outcome-based performance indicators (such as improving community welfare) to measure integrative impact.

However, structural transformation is not enough without a change in work culture. Sectoral mentality and lack of trust between OPDs are the main obstacles. For this reason, cultural steps such as cross-agency collaboration training, the formation of integration champions, and informal interaction spaces need to be optimized. Appreciation of successful collaboration practices and political support from regional heads can strengthen the legitimacy of change. It is also important to involve civil society in the entire program cycle through public consultation forums and feedback mechanisms so that GTRA services are truly responsive to real needs.

The implementation of these steps must be supported by detailed technical policies that translate the Presidential Regulation and Regent's Decree into operational guidelines, including definitions of responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, and conflict resolution procedures. By combining structural, technical, and cultural approaches—and using the Konrad Framework (1996) as an evaluation compass—GTRA in Sragen and Temanggung has the potential to transform into a sustainable strategic collaboration model. Effective service integration not only minimizes inefficiencies but also becomes a

long-term investment in strengthening agrarian justice and community welfare.

Personal Dimension: New Findings in Cross-Sector Collaboration

Field findings in Sragen and Temanggung Regencies reveal that the effectiveness of GTRA institutions is not only determined by formal structures and technocratic policies but is greatly influenced by the personal dimensions of its actors. In practice, GTRA extensively depends on the capacity, initiative, and commitment of individuals, particularly the chief of the land office and technical officials from the agriculture service, who serve as the primary drivers in facilitating cross-sector coordination. Without the presence of these key actors, the GTRA forum tends to be passive and only active around evaluation moments or ceremonial activities.

These individual actors play the role of bridging leaders, namely connecting leaders who are able to translate collective goals into real actions in the field. They use social capital, personal credibility, and informal networks to bridge structural fragmentation between regional apparatus organizations. In Temanggung, for example, the effectiveness of collaboration increased significantly due to the presence of technical staff who understand the "sectoral language" of each OPD and are able to align the dynamics of diverse interests. This suggests that collaborative leadership literacy—including cross-sectoral empathy, communication skills, and sensitivity to power dynamics—is a key element in the successful implementation of GTRA.

However, over-reliance on personal figures also poses serious institutional risks. Changes in positions, transfers, or retirements of key actors have the potential to disintegrate the coordination that has been established. The absence of knowledge transfer mechanisms and institutions that accommodate social capital demonstrates the weakness of the institutionalization process of the personal dimension in the GTRA structure. In this context, personal motivations such as siding with farmers, ecological awareness, and reformist idealism often become the driving force of change that goes beyond the structural limitations of the bureaucracy.

The personal dimension has also proven to be a "lubricant" that allows a rigid bureaucratic system to continue to operate. The informal and flexible approach taken by these actors allows them to overcome the rigidity of administrative procedures and accelerate the resolution of various complex agrarian problems. Therefore, GTRA needs to develop reward mechanisms, mentoring, and documentation of good practices to institutionalize the personal dimension into a more adaptive institutional design. The concept of adaptive leadership in this case becomes relevant, namely leadership that is able to learn from environmental dynamics, respond quickly to changes, and distribute leadership to various levels in the organization. In final analysis, the personal factor is essential to GTRA governance and cross-sector engagement. Recognizing, developing, and repeating effective personal capacities is a strategic investment to establish a system that relies on individuals yet is institutionally strong. The future success of GTRA will depend on how well this human dimension can be systemically integrated into a responsive, adaptive, and sustainable collaborative institutional architecture.

Global findings show three patterns relevant to GTRA: (1) Compliance-Ineffectiveness Gap: High procedural compliance

(89% in India—Chaudhary, 2019) but weak outcomes; (2) Personalized Institutionalization: The success of Brazil's MST relies on charismatic leaders (Wolford, 2010), similar to the Temanggung case; (3) SOP Paradox: Standardization actually increases exclusion when local capacities are diverse (Hall & Kepe, 2017) and power asymmetries persist. Therefore, GTRA transformation requires a hybrid structure that combines formal SOPs with informal innovation zones, as well as a real-time monitoring dashboard for budget synchronization and community participation.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) reveals a central paradox in Indonesia's bureaucratic reform efforts: individual actors often serve as critical bridges in fragmented systems, but this personalization risks undermining long-term institutional resilience. While 91% of successful collaborations were enabled by informal mediation from key actors, 63% of those efforts deteriorated following personnel changes, leading to significant knowledge discontinuity. This highlights the need to institutionalize social capital through structured leadership pipelines and codified knowledge-transfer mechanisms.

This study contributes to agrarian reform discourse in three significant ways. First, it underscores the double-edged nature of personalistic leadership—essential for short-term breakthroughs, yet inherently unstable without systemic reinforcement. Second, it exposes a gap between ceremonial compliance and substantive performance. Although GTRA forums were consistently held, only 29% produced actionable outcomes. This mirrors similar failures in South Africa's District Land Reform Committees and reflects how Indonesia's hierarchical governance culture clashes with GTRA's intended horizontal collaboration design. Third, standardized procedures meant to foster coordination often inhibit flexibility where bureaucratic capacity is uneven. In Temanggung, 41% of delays stemmed from the inability of local agencies to meet rigid SOP requirements. These insights suggest the need for a hybrid governance model that combines formal accountability mechanisms with adaptive "innovation zones" that enable context-specific experimentation.

From a policy standpoint, advancing GTRA requires three strategic shifts. First, structural hybridity should be promoted by embedding informal problem-solving networks within formal institutions through cross-agency action labs. Second, leadership development must go beyond technical training, fostering collaborative literacy among OPDs through capacity-building in conflict resolution, horizontal coordination, and participatory budgeting. Third, a real-time integration dashboard should be developed to monitor the progress of SOP implementation, budget convergence, and community participation—ensuring transparency and responsiveness.

Acknowledging its limitations—including Kantah-centric perspectives and a geographically narrow sample—this study opens avenues for further research. Future work should quantify patronage networks using actor-network analysis, explore outcomes across Indonesia's diverse regional contexts, and pilot the proposed hybrid governance model in selected districts.

Theoretically, this research enriches the intersection of Konrad's (1996) multidimensional integration framework and Ansell & Gash's (2008) collaborative governance model, while pragmatically, it advances a shift from procedural compliance

toward strategic, relationship-driven partnerships. Ultimately, GTRA's success hinges not on bureaucratic formalities but on its ability to transform institutional culture—moving from siloed operations to co-created, justice-oriented solutions. As such, agrarian reform may finally fulfill its constitutional mandate: to realize equitable, inclusive prosperity for all Indonesians.

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